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I have read the documentation prepared for your conference with considerable 
interest. It covers many different fields, and provides evidence of a serious and 
detailed attempt to grapple with the many professional and political issues that arise in 
this area. My own necessarily limited contribution to your discussions will involve 
some case histories from my own country, and will raise some questions which may 
merit further discussion. What I have to suggest focuses on the processes bh which 
media are produced, rther than on media products, because process is, I believe, the 
most fruitful context in which to discuss the dynamic reality that is media today. 
 
At the outset, however, it is important to recognise how much the media has changed, 
and is changing, even since the process on which you are engaged began in Barcelona 
two years ago. The growth of the internet, of web-based publishing and of blogging 
has generated new challenges, not only for traditional journalism but also for public 
officials and administrative systems. Recent research by Harvard’s Berkman Center 
for Internet and Society has shown that in the last five years the number of states 
carrying out state-mandated net filtering – which I suppose is a polite word for 
censorship – has grown from a handful to more than two dozen. Countries which 
carry out the broadest range of filtering include Burma, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The filtering has three primary 
rationales, according to the report: politics and power, security concerns and social 
norms. In other countries, notably in the EU, filtering is carried out by the private 
sector rather than by the state.1 
 
The emphasis, in this official response to new media, on politics, power and security 
is especially relevant to the theme of your conference. And it is hardly surprising that 
the growth of filtering technology is being followed, as night follows day, by the 
                                                 
1 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6665945.stm - BBC News. Accessed 
18 May 2007. 
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development of circumvention technology. The new media provide new battlegrounds 
for conflicts between citizens and the state, between different groups within the state, 
and even between states themselves. Your role in these emerging areas of contention 
will be critical. And, as you develop that role, it is worth remembering that there are 
two sides to the blogging coin. One side of it is well expressed by the adage that a lie 
can be half way around the world before truth gets its boots on. But the other side of 
the coin is that blogging also has a role as a kind of quality check on mainstream 
media. This is because it can – and has – on occasion helped to identify errors, biases 
and other shortcomings in those sections of the media that tend to stake their 
reputations on accuracy, authenticity and reliability. 
 
However, it is important not to be seduced by technology. The task you have set 
yourselves, if I interpret it correctly, is to devise strategies and structures in this area 
which do not depend on any particular form or level of technology for their 
development and implementation. 
 
I hope I am also correct in assuming that you would generally share Thomas 
Jefferson’s view that the truth will prevail “unless disarmed of her natural weapons, 
free argument and debate.” 
 
In practice, of course, life is not as simple as that. All states reserve the right to 
protect themselves and, in an era increasingly dominated by low-intensity conflict, the 
question sometimes becomes not one of whether there should be any constraints on 
media, but when, how many, and by whom they are operated.  
 
The history of Ireland in the past eight decades provides a fascinating case history of 
this process in operation, of its evolution, and indeed of its duration. Although our 
civil war ended formally in 1923, its effects  - including further episodes of political 
violence – have continued to be experienced for a further eighty years. In 1939 it was 
made a criminal offence for any publication in this state to refer by name to the IRA. 
The only descriptive words allowed were “an illegal organisation”.  One of the former 
members of that “illegal organisation” is now a member of the new power-sharing 
administration in Northern Ireland. That law has never been repealed. In the past 35 
years it was broken every day, and no publication was ever prosecuted. 
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Another law was  introduced in the early 1970s to ban the broadcasting of interviews 
with members of Sinn Fein, then a legal political party, but described by one 
government minister of the day as “a public relations agency for a murder gang”. It 
was repealed thirty years later, before the final ceasefire by the IRA, as a confidence 
building measure designed to encourage that organisation to abandon its armed 
struggle. Almost decade later, that ceasefire led to the formal abandonment of the 
armed struggle as a political option. The question of the often cloudy relationships 
between legal political organisations and illegal para-military organisations to which 
they may be linked, and the relationship between both and the media, remains a live 
one to this day, and continues to have significance for media organisations and for 
states.  
 
Also in Ireland, the highly problematic nature of the relationship between 
governments and media – in particular, public service broadcasters – was exemplified 
by a government decision in 1972 to dismiss the entire governing body of the public 
broadcasting system because, in the government’s view, they had broadcast material 
which was effectively, in the words of your conference title, an incitement to 
terrorism. 
 
All this happened a long time ago, but this does not mean that it lacks contemporary 
relevance. For example, the argument between government and media at that time 
was, as it generally is, about means rather than ends. The consensus opposes 
terrorism; the consensus is at least in theory in favour of freedom of the press. The no-
man’s-land in the middle is where the bodies are strewn. A government prohibition 
that is too vague engenders self-censorship or worse in media organisations. One that 
is too specific involves government directly in the vitally important function of 
editing, in a way that threatens the central tenet of a free press. 
 
And the issue of “incitement” was at the core of an argument about the introduction of 
new security legislation in the mid-1970s when the print media successfully 
persuaded the government of the day to modify a draft law which, in the view of the 
newspapers, invited the courts to equate reportage with incitement. 
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Both government officials and journalists have to acknowledge – and to implement in 
their own practices – this difference between reportage and incitement, even though 
this crucial difference may at times be obscured or even partially compromised by the 
speed of modern communications and the intensity of the conflict which is being 
reported. It may also be obscured by the fact that nobody who picks up a newspaper 
or turns on a radio or television set has a mind like a blank slate waiting to be written 
on. A graphic newspaper or television image of the carnage caused by a terrorist 
bomb may inspire many to greater efforts to defeat the terrorism that caused it. It may 
give others, equally opposed to terrorism,s the hollow, despairing feeling that 
terrorism can never be defeated. It may even – and without any intention on the part 
of the publishers -  incite terrorists to repeat the tactic in the light of what they 
perceive to be its evident success. 
 
Government and journalists alike, in this context, can at least start with an acceptance 
of good faith on both sides. Professional journalism is neither a willing nor an 
unwilling collaborator with terrorism. Government officials who are trying to do their 
jobs do not generally have, as their prime objective, the eradication of free speech. 
But they are different entities, with different tasks to perform, and the fact that they 
may often come into conflict does not have to be a cause for despair – indeed, a 
certain amount of tension is inevitable, and probably a good thing overall. And 
acceptance of good faith can be buttressed by an acceptance that people and 
institutiions make mistakes, and that mistakes are not necessarily evidence of bad 
faith, of bias, or of malice: more often than not, they are just that – mistakes, made 
under the pressure of events. 
 
But there are also two issues which should, I think, be addressed, one by each side, if 
the relationship between media and government is to develop fruitfully in situations in 
which terrorism and low-level but intense conflict is endemic. 
 
The first can perhaps be identified as the tendency for governments to think of media 
purely in terms of their utility to the opposing forces. If it is true, as it sometimes is, 
that terrorists can use media for their own purposes, perhaps states should resist the 
temptation to think of the media in the same terms.  
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It is tempting to believe that if terrorists can use the media to challenge the state, the 
state can use the media to defeat terrorism, but in my view this is an over-
simplification. This is because the function of media is multi-layered.  
 
There are times when the function of the media in relation to terrorism should include, 
not only exposure of the effects of terrorism, but inquiry, explanation, and the 
provision of contextual information which will be important for decision-makers and 
which will reflect more accurately the complex political, ideological and social 
realities that underpin terrorist actions and policies. This is not incitement, much less 
support, for terrorism. And there are many occasions when this role of the media can, 
and should, be accompanied by trenchant oppposition to terrorism. The role of media, 
as it has traditionally been understood, is that of speaking truth to power – whether 
that power is based on a democratic mandate or, as in the case of terrorism, on the 
power of the bomb and the gun.  
 
There is a need, in this area, not primarily for the structures of censorship and state 
control (although these may occasionally be required in very extreme circumstances), 
but for structures which allow public decision-makers and journalists alike to explain 
their strongly held views to each other, without the need to reach agreement, but with 
the objective of creating a greater mutual understanding of each other’s goals and 
aspirations.  
 
The growth of university departments of media, communications and journalism 
world-wide, not least in the countries from which many of you come, offers the 
possibility of creating appropriate, often informal structures in which all those 
working for the elimination of terrorism and political violence can meet as equals who 
share common ideals and can discuss experiences and strategies in a context which 
does not have to divide the participants into censors and libertarians,  winners and 
losers. 
 
The second issue is one which relates to journalists more than to governments. 
Journalists need to ask themselves whether their traditional professional objectives of 
impartiality, objectivity and accuracy – objectives which have a much more limited 
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reality and utility than many journalists optimistically suppose – are in themselves 
sufficient in the context of terrorism and political violence. 
 
To report, I would argue, is also to participate, although in a different sense from the 
participation of the protagonists in any coflict involving terrorism or political 
violence. Because all journalism involves selection, and because all selection involves 
a value judgment on the part of those making the selection, the media are actors (not 
in the dramatic sense, of course!) as well as observers. In this context, journalists can 
learn to become more aware of their own value judgments, and can be encouraged to 
introduce an element of reflection into what is, by and large, an instinctive process 
often carried out at high speed.  
 
They ca nalso  contribute to the lowering of tension and a reduction, perhaps even 
eventually the elimination, of political violence, by encouraging the development of 
peace processes and by resisting the temptation to allow themselves to be used by 
either side in negotiations as part of the apparatus of megaphone diplomacy.  
 
But they cannot do this on their own. If the experience of our own small island is any 
guide, it shows that the prime movers in this sort of situation are usually political. It 
was not until the political actors involved in the Northern Ireland situation, and 
particularly the British government, became convinced that the solution to the 
problem of terrorism in Northern Ireland lay in the political rather than in the military 
or the security sphere, that media in both islands became conscious of the possibilities 
of exploring the potential solution, rather than sensationalising the violent 
confrontations which for years had been the staple diet of reportage. 
 
There were mistakes, here, too, of course. The journalistic consensus against terrorism 
was so strong that many journalists, intially, misjudged or under-estimated the 
significance of the peace process. For  time, therefore, there was a time-lag. Behind 
the scenes, moves towards peace accelerated while the media continued to be 
dominated by the images of conflict and the sounds of recrimination.  
 
As well as mistakes being made, risks were taken. For example many journalists, 
once the peace process had been effectively launched, minimised or even ignored the 
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para-military pasts of some of the political activists, in the interests of encouraging 
the process itself. Turning a blind eye in this sense may have assisted the peace 
process in some ways, but it hampered it in others. This was because many of  those 
who had been the victims of para-military violence, feeling – understandably -  that 
their suffering was being ignored or discounted, and that criminals were being 
allowed to go unpunished, hardened their attitudes and retreated from agreement.  
 
There are limits, of course, to what journalism can achieve, and these limits are not 
usually under the control of journalists themselves. If, in a divided society, the media 
are also divided and there are no shared or common media, then the role of the media 
in bringing an end to terrorism or political violence of any kind will of necessity be 
more limited. Some recent research by an Israeli scholar on the role of the Israeli and 
Northern Ireland media in relation to both the Oslo Agreement and the Belfast 
Agreement offers convincing, if somewhat disheartening, evidence for this point of 
view.2 
 
Journalists also need to ask themselves, as part of this exercise of self-examination,  
whether, or to what extent, their professional values can be modified – and perhaps on 
occasion even compromised – by the fierce competition between media for readers, 
audiences and advertisers. If political passions are running high in civil society, the 
temptation for media is to echo, perhaps even inflame further, those passions to 
achieve objectives that are commercial rather than journalistic.  
 
There are many examples of this kind of media attitude in contexts where terrorism is 
not even an issue . In ordinary civil societies where crime rates are not dramatically 
changing, for instance, it is not unknown for media, in the interests of greater sales,  
to set about frightening their readers by the exaggerated reporting of criminal activity, 
particularly of crimes involving violence.  
 
In the context of political violence and terrorism journalism can contribute to a 
heightening of tension, and perhaps even to a delay in arriving at negiotiated 
                                                 
2 Wolfsfeld, Gadi (2004), Media and the Path to Peace (Cambridge) 
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solutions, by maximising the reporting of confrontation and by minimising or 
ignoring the possibilities for negotiation. If this sells more papers or generates more 
listeners or viewers, it is  temptation which is sometimes difficult to avoid. Very often 
journalists find themselves all but powerless when faced by these forces and these 
agendas. This is the context in which I think other structures might also be considered 
– structures within media organisations which could  allow journalists the room and 
the time to reflect, collegially, on what they are doing, on how they are doing it, and 
on the possible effects of doing their job in different but equally valid ways. 
 
I am not suggesting that all journalistic decisions about content, editorial policy, news 
priorities and emphasis should be taken by committee – far from it. In media 
organisations, whether public or private, there has long been acceptance of the 
principle that editors are, at the end of the day, solely responsible for decisions like 
these (even though they may be made on occasion by subordinates) in much the same 
way as the captain of a ship has unquestioned authority. If editors are not doing a 
good job, there is no point in trying to second-guess them, or to surround them with 
watchdogs who will make sure that they toe a particular line or editorial policy. In the 
long and indeed in the short run also, there is only one cure for an editor who isn’t up 
to scratch: a new editor. 
 
What I am suggesting is that journalists - particularly middle-ranking, serious 
journalists with a wealth of experience – should take the lead in setting up structures 
in their own media organisations within which purely professional and ethical issues 
of the kind I have outlined can be discussed. These can be established within the 
context of existing professional journalistic organisations, including trade unions, or 
quite independently. They could be internal to any given media organisation, or 
shared between different media organisations. These discussions may or may not have 
an influence on overall editorial policy, which in the last analysis is subject to many 
other pressures as well. But they will inevitably, if they are taken seriously, contribute 
to a deepening and strengthening of the professional and ethical sense of journalists in 
key positions in ways which will enable not only individual journalists, but the media 
as a whole, to tackle more effectively the issues you are discussing at your 
conference. These are issues not only of politics and professionalism, but issues, for 
many people, of life and death itself. 
